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(iii) 
PREFACE 
Primary sector production is characterised by the 
limited extent of production control possible. The major 
factor limiting the control of production is climate. 
Management of an agricultural or horticultural production 
system involves the manipulation of resources within a given 
climatic environment; this factor has the potential to 
drastically alter the outcome of management decisions. 
This paper addresses the question of the impact of 
adverse climatic events, the role of farmer management in 
handling such events, the possibilities for private sector 
insurance schemes and the potential impact of government 
intervention in the supply of risk reducing systems. Given 
the historical New Zealand demand for government relief 
measures on a seemingly annual basis as a result of climatic 
fluctuations, this paper presents a review of the likely 
impact of such relief measures and suggests that there may 
be better ways to handle such events. 
All business activities take place within an 
environment involving risk. Business management includes 
the management of risk; the effect of government in 
modifying the risk management systems needs to be carefully 
considered. 
R.G. Lattimore, 
DIRECTOR. 
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SUMMARY 
Despite the many factors that contribute to the annual 
variations in agricultural production, climatic fluctuations 
explain much of the variability. Although these fluctu-
ations include flood, snow, hail and wind damages, the 
report concentrates on drought. Given that droughts occur 
with varying frequency to many parts of the country, the 
important question from an efficiency perspective is how to 
ameliorate the cost of these droughts. We are not concerned 
with measuring the "cost" of drought by making comparisons 
with a perfect world that is the so-called nirvana 
fallacy. We are concerned with finding a least-cost 
solution to the whole issue of adverse events. 
Historically, one of the justifications for government 
involvement has been that adverse events relief is a so-
called "public good" which cannot be accommodated within the 
private sector. Externalities are said to exist when costs 
of an action are borne by persons other than those able to 
be directly affected by the outcome of that action, and it 
is considered that an externality exists because people 
other than farmers are affected by droughts or floods. 
However, recent literature in welfare economics suggests 
that the existence of externalities do not necessarily 
require government action. Does the private sector offer a 
"better" solution, and, if so, what are the impediments to 
transferring the role of adverse events relief to the 
private sector? 
Government has provided grants and subsidies to 
mitigate the effects of both droughts and floods in recent 
years. These schemes, as well as other government policies, 
are shown to alter the private solution to adverse events. 
Farmers alter management strategies if it is considered that 
ad hoc drought relief packages will be available from 
government. Irrigation is not considered to present an 
economically viable option for drought risk management, as 
the costs of "premiums" are too high. The futures market 
has little potential for handling climatic risk, as yield 
and not price is generally affected by droughts and floods. 
The role of insurance schemes is investigated in 
detail. Among American, Canadian, Australian and New 
Zealand programs for adverse events insurance, the Canadian 
forage crop programs, although in the early stage of 
development, would appear to have most relevance to New 
Zealand. All the schemes reviewed, however, lack financial 
viability without government subsidies. 
The justification for subsidisation of insurance 
schemes is that it allows government to withdraw completely 
from providing solutions on an ad hoc basis and the 
associated cost involved with these policies. The 
responsibility passes from a public to a private solution, 
even though some form of subsidisation would be necessary. 
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SECTION I INTRODUCTION 
Adverse events such as droughts, floods, hail, and 
storms are a constant problem in countries allover the 
world. When there is an adverse event, pleas are made to 
government for direct or indirect assistance. As the New 
Zealand Government is re-evaluating its role in supporting 
and stabilising the economy, it is relevant to investigate 
both efficiency and equity issues involved in government 
programs concerned with adverse events. It is likely that 
often the government intervention is undertaken on political 
grounds rather than economic grounds. Decisions made for 
political reasons should be clearly identified and not 
justified as being for economic efficiency or equity. 
While snowstorms and floods affect some pastoral areas 
of New Zealand, emphasis in this paper will be given to the 
role of government assistance in times of drought. In 
recent years the area around Hawke's Bay and South 
Canterbury - North Otago have sustained significant droughts 
due to an overall shortage of moisture at critical times of 
the year. The problems for cash crop and horticultural 
regions are viewed as frost and hail, and to a lesser 
extent, wind and flood. There have been several programs 
developed in New Zealand to deal with the specific risks for 
this type of farming. These programs are discussed later. 
In New Zealand, the issue of appropriate mechanisms for 
ameliorating the effects of climatic events has been the 
subject of previous inquiries. J.G. Pryde in 1966 
investigated the range of existing programs and 
possibilities. It still remains true that some producers do 
not fully understand the probability of loss due to adverse 
events or choose to ignore them with the expectation that 
the public sector will "bail them out if things go bad." 
The purpose of this report is to examine the role of 
government in adverse events relief in New Zealand, with 
emphasis given to drought relief. The paper starts with a 
discussion establishing a definition of drought. This is 
followed by a review of the theoretical literature relating 
to collective action and a discussion of the effects of 
short term adverse events assistance. 
Previous policies which have been introduced by 
government to assist in adverse climatic events are 
discussed, along with a section on how these public policies 
may amend private management strategies. This leads to a 
discussion on the use and usefulness of computer models, 
including both aggregate and farm level decision models and 
weather models. Following on from management strategies 
designed to alleviate the impacts of drought is a major 
section looking at alternative options, both individual and 
collective, of reducing the cost of a drought situation. 
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This section starts with a look at the futures market as a 
potential vehicle and then concentrates on the issue of risk 
and insurance. Both the theoretical issues and a review of 
the literature on existing adverse events insurance schemes 
are covered. Examples of the current United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand programs are provided, with 
limitations and potential applications of these schemes 
presented. 
SECTION 2 COLLECTIVE ACTION - LOGIC AND REASON 
The first issue in evaluating the role of government in 
adverse events assistance is to examine the theoretical 
justification for government involvement. This section will 
review the literature on collective action to set the stage 
for determining the government's role in providing 
assistance. 
There are at least two broad avenues open for society 
to modify the performance of an economy. One is to have the 
government organise public activity to produce the desired 
product in the most efficient manner. This provision can 
take the form of the public agency actually supplying the 
product, or by using subsidies or penalties, it can 
encourage the private sector to provide the product. The 
second is to modify private property rights which lie behind 
market transactions. 
It has been agreed in the literature that there is a 
class of products entitled "public goods" which will only be 
provided if done so by government. A variety of definitions 
have been developed as to what constitutes a "public good". 
The modern view of economists' is that this particular set 
of goods usually involve the attenuation (reduction) of 
property rights which means that the benefits of the good 
cannot be appropriated totally and/or problems of 
inefficiencies in pricing. It is possible to extend this 
public good analysis to activities which exhibit decreasing 
costs to scale. 
Goods which are publicly provided could be supplied by 
the private sector. Traditionally services such as 
education, resource based recreation, mass transit, and fire 
and police protection have been viewed as the domain of the 
public sector, but there have always existed examples of 
these products being supplied privately. Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962) developed a logical construct to explain why 
activities should be in the public sphere. Their system 
displays a continuum. They allow for action to be taken on 
the basis of purely private individualistic action, by 
voluntary private collective bargaining or public sector 
collective action. "The individual should choose to shift 
to the public sector all activities in which the cost of 
collective decision making is less than the cost of 
voluntary private collective bargaining which is less than 
the costs resulting from purely individualistic behaviour." 
The decision rule is predicated on the original assignment 
of property rights. 
The costs of individualistic behaviour are seen by 
Buchanan and Tullock as "externalities", costs imposed on 
others by one's action. The classic examples are air, 
water, and noise pollution. Pigou purported to show that in 
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the case of a polluting factory, there would arise a 
divergence between the social optimum rate of output and the 
private optimum rate. He develops his thesis on the basis 
that the factory o~ner need not take into account all of the 
costs of his action. The result is that other individuals 
in society bear external costs. Since in his analysis the 
damaged parties are unable to enter into "contracting", the 
factory owner produces at the short and long run optimum 
where SRMC (short run marginal cost) equals LRMC (long run 
marginal cost) which equals MR (marginal revenue) excluding 
the costs imposed by his pollution. This deviation is 
called "social cost." 
Cheung (1978) sees Pigou's analysis as merely "muddying 
the waters" and therefore obstructing useful research into 
means of achieving optimum resource allocation. He 
summarises his analysis as follows: 
"The presence of uncontracted effects such as 
pollution may result in an imbalance, but this is 
viewed simply as a situation where the marginal 
cost of an action deviates from its marginal 
returns, without regard to any divergence between 
private and social cost." 
If "social cost" is not the relevant issue, then what 
is? The most promising of areas is that of property rights 
and their assignment. Coase (1960) showed convincingly that 
external effects need not necessarily lead to resource 
misallocation. All that is necessary is that trade be able 
to occur. Under Coase's system there must be no transaction 
costs and property rights must be well defined and 
enforceable. Burton (1978) summarises Coase by saying: 
"The Coase analysis knocked the supports from 
under the Pigovian analysis, and pointed to 
entirely different implications for public policy. 
First, where there are no barriers to trade 
between the producer and the consumer of an 
externality, government intervention is not called 
for because a bargaining solution would emerge. 
Second. it implied that the real trouble with 
social cost is not externalities (uncontracted 
effects) per se, but rather barriers to trade in 
the form of high transactions costs and 
attenuations of property rights that prevent a 
bargaining solution from emerging." 
The major problem then as seen by writers such as 
Chueng, Coase, and Buchanan is that of transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are those encountered in moving in the 
Buchanan and Tullock framework from individualistic action 
to either collective action or voluntary private collective 
bargaining. These costs include acquiring information, 
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negotiating the price to be paid, charging for the use of 
the resource, and excluding 'free riders' from consuming 
resources they have not provided or paid for. 
A special set of problems arise with common property 
resources, notably, the air and oceans. These resources are 
the direct opposite of private property. Here access is not 
restricted but rather open to all. The solution may be to 
establish a private property solution such as the Individual 
Transferable Quota System proposed for the inshore 
fisheries. Again the problem is in the assignment of 
private property rights and their enforcement. 
Excluded from the discussion of pure reasons for 
collective action are non-market benefits. Non-market 
benefits are sometimes referred to as intangibles - a set of 
returns which cannot be directly measured or evaluated in 
economic terms. They may be assigned a high or an infinite 
value. The difficulty of accepting such benefits at these 
values is that political decisions are made which have 
significant economic consequences. In order to facilitate 
better decision making, it is necessary to establish 
reasonable proxies for such values. 
A corollary issue is the ability to bear risk. In fact 
risk bearing is based on a foundation of information and 
wealth. There are certainly some cases where a product or 
activity cannot be left to individualistic action, but 
rather must be dealt with by a private voluntary 
organisation or by collective action. Again the Buchanan 
and Tullock criteria is a useful framework. An excellent 
example would be public action to deal with preventing the 
introduction of foot and mouth disease. While the 
probability of an occurence is low, the damage caused would 
be tremendous and effects would be felt by a substantial 
portion of the rural and urban population. 
In summary, several points bear making. First, the 
existance of externalities does not necessarily require 
government action. As Buchanan and Tullock point out, 
compulsory collective action is only justified when costs 
are less than those from voluntary private collective 
bargaining or individual action. Politically, it is often 
expedient to ignore the high costs involved in government 
intervention, particularly the distortions in economic 
signals sent to producers. 
Second, the costs of government intervention may exceed 
the benefits achieved. These costs include transaction 
costs as well as the costs associated with distortions 
introduced to the economy if the intervention is not 
warranted. 
Third, 
agenda to 
prestige, 
governments and 
maximise their 
and income. 
politicians generally have an 
own objectives such as power, 
Rare are the cases where a 
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bureaucracy has willingly reduced its power. Regulation 
tends to be a one way street. Producers, in particular, 
adjust to an institutional framework and optimise subject to 
i't. 
Fourth, no reason exists ~ priori that government 
commands more knowledge than do individuals. It is in the 
best interests of the participants in an economic sector to 
inform themselves so as to maximise their returns. 
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SECTION 3 ADVERSE EVENTS - PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 
3.1 THE LOGIC OF ASSISTANCE FOR ADVERSE EVENTS 
Here we will not be concerned with long term government 
intervention, but rather this section will inquire into the 
effectiveness of temporary assistance. Into this category 
fall programs to offset the impact of droughts, floods, and 
other acts of nature. In the recent past such programs have 
included transportation grants, freight subsidies, 
concessional loans, and regrassing grants such as for the 
North Otago and Hakataramea Valley districts. 
In the case of adverse events, claims are made that 
significant costs are imposed. There is no question that to 
an individual the costs may be dramatic - even catastrophic. 
Ritchie (1982) reports that in the 1977/78 drought, gross 
income loss was $21 million. This estimate was derived in 
the following manner: 
25 million lambs killed for export 
at .5kg less than 1976/77 
1.7 million beef cattle killed at 
10kg less than 1976/77 
5 million ewes killed at 2kg less 
than 1976/77 
Cost (mill of $) 
$ 8.0 
$10.7 
$ 2.8 
In addition the estimate was made that another $29 
million of lost income occurred in 1978/79 due to lower 
lambing percentages and loss of wool production. If an 
adverse event affected the entire country, this type of 
analysis might be valid. However, it appears that no 
recognition is taken of market price responses to supply 
shifts. The question should be asked whether the income of 
firms not affected by the event went up. The correct answer 
is to evaluate the net loss to all firms not simply the 
gross loss to those affected. 
As well as economic effects, the human cost is 
recounted in the popular press with the onset of every 
disaster. Anecdotal evidence is given to justify government 
intervention. Stories are recounted of farmers feeding 
lines of stock in the burning sun while pastures shrivel, 
recede and disappear. "These bare paddocks grew nothing but 
dung." (Little, cited in Ritchie). The June 1985 issue of 
the New Zealand Journal of Agriculture is replete with 
articles portraying the plight of the drought stricken 
farmer. The conclusion seems to be that government must 
supply the props to provide equity. 
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Analyses such as the above are examples of the "Nirvana 
fallacy" (Demsetz, 1969). This fallacy arises when economic 
reality which includes climatic problems, price instability, 
and yield variability is compared with some "perfect" 
situation devoid of any problems. Such deviations 
(downwards) from optimal conditions will always exist, and 
it is rather academic to compare reality with "Nirvana." 
Also, as Anderson (1985) points out, with respect to 
weather, the costs receive much more discussion than the 
benefits. 
There seems to be little or no thought or recognition 
given to a Buchanan and Tullock type analysis of the 
necessity of government action. It appears to be enough 
that an environmental change in the form of adverse weather 
exists. The justification for government intervention 
should be that private solutions are not as efficient in 
alleviating adverse events problems. 
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3.2 ADVERSE EVENTS ASSISTANCE POLICIES 
It is instructive to examine the experience in other 
countries when evaluating adverse events intervention 
policies. Freebairn (1983) analysed the measures utilised 
by the Australian Government to deal with the 1982-83 
drought. He notes that subsidisation of purchased fodder 
caused farmers to retain more stock and increase the feeding 
rate. This behaviour tended to even out the supply of wool 
and meat over the drought and post-drought period. He 
concluded that at best no more than 50 per cent of drought 
affected sheep and cattle producers received benefit from 
feed subsidies. Also, some of the benefits went to overseas 
consumers in the form of lower meat prices and to domestic 
fodder producers due to higher prices. Perhaps most 
important was that farmers in non-drought areas and drought 
area farmers who employed alternative strategies suffered 
losses due to adverse price changes. 
As well as fodder subsidies, the Australian Government 
have also provided interest rate subsidies. This took two 
forms concessional carry-on loans and debt interest 
subsidies. Freebairn suggests that as with fodder subsidies 
the interest rate program was discriminatory and led to 
distortion in resource allocation. The interest rate 
subsidy programs tended to benefit only that subset of 
farmers who were judged to be "viable prospects for the long 
term," but who were unable to obtain a commercial loan. 
They received a loan at 4 per cent. However, an adjacent 
farmer might have to pay 14.5 per cent through regular 
commercial channels. Farmers who were viewed as not 
standing a good chance to succeed were denied a concessional 
loan. Freebairn summed up the result of temporary 
assistance as follows: 
"Both fodder and interest rate subsidies 
provide incentives for farmers to lessen their 
efforts to cope with future droughts from 
their own resources. They discourage the 
conservation of fodder, use of conservation 
stocking rates and building up of financial 
reserves because these strategies receive no 
subsidies." 
It seems reasonable to conclude that if an industry 
assumes assistance will be provided, the incentive to 
undertake alternative private measures will be reduced. 
These alternatives could include non-governmental collective 
action as well as individual measures. 
Climatic relief loans have been issued by the Rural 
Bank to New Zealand farmers at concessionary rates over the 
last few years. Figures obtained from the Bank (Table 1) 
show the followoing amounts have been issued for the last 
three years. 
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Tab 1 e 1
Rural Bank Climatic Relief Loans
National Canterbury District
Year No. Total $Mill No. Total $Mill
1985 583 14.92 109 2.39
1984 1351 26.34 389 6.97
1983 369 5.75 153 2.61
Source: Rural Bank Annual Report and Christchurch Branch
figures from Alan Searle, pers com.
Interest rates are seven and a half per cent for the 1983-84
years, and 9 per cent for 1985. This would indicate a
concession of at least 10 per cent on the later loans.
Suspensory loans have been announced for North Otago - South
Canterbury farmers. By early April 1986 some 245 loan
applications had been lodged with the Rural Bank in Dunedin.
These loans were for a maximum of $50,000 per farm, and
averaged just over $30,000. The terms are interest and
principal free until June 1988, and then on "commercial"
interest rates. If the property is sold before that date,
the loans then become grants for farmers. In an environment
of high interest rates, a substantial concessionary element
exists in these loans.
Following the 1985 Gisborne floods, the government set
a relief operation in place. Some 448 people, mostly
farmers, registered under the relief scheme. The two major
components of this scheme were a restoration grant and an
employment grant. The restoration grant is budgeted for an
estimated cost of $620,000 to the government, excluding
administration and helicopter costs. Some 80 per cent of
restoration costs (regrassirig, restoring water supplies,
etc.) is paid out of this scheme. The P.E.P. employment
scheme initially employed some 148 workers, but by February
1986 had scaled down to between 40 and 50 workers.
Estimated direct costs of this scheme were $436,000 (Peter
Andrews, MAF Gisborne, pers com.).
Harris and Stevenson (1979) concluded that the 1978
Southland flood relief temporary employment program was a
cost-effective operation - "With a benefit: cost ratio of
1.98 it is clear that the programme's short run benefits to
the nation considerably exceeded its short run costs."
Thus, from a short run efficiency perspective the employment
1 3 
program is a good scheme. From an equity perspective, as 
Harris and Stevenson conclude with respect to Southland, 
"The group in society actually receiving the resource 
benefit were farmers." 
Medium-to-long term costs are difficult to measure, but 
these will probably accrue to farmers as owners of the land 
resource at the time of the floods. MAF officers estimated 
that some 5 per cent of stocking capacity was lost on the 
average farm as a result of the floods and land slips. 
Multiplier effects will translate this into a regional loss. 
However, some medium to long term costs will also 
accrue to the nation as we set up this general expectation 
that adverse events are the responsibility of the taxpayer. 
Given a series of precedents it would be unusual for 
Governments in the emotive atmosphere of an adverse event to 
announce that it would no longer grant adverse events 
assistance. 
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3.3 DROUGHT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND RELATED ISSUES 
Much has been written about both light land and drought 
management strategies. Recent pUblications in this area 
include the MAF reports by Crump and Ritchie (1982) and the 
Lincoln College report edited by Crabb (1983). These 
reports contain little information that is not already 
incorporated into the management philosophy and strategy of 
most New Zealand farmers who are faced with periodic 
droughts. However, what has possibly changed in the last 
few years is the impact of government policies on farm 
management strategies, with several almost perverse outcomes 
eventuating from the cumulative effects of different 
policies. Thus the private response to adverse events may 
be modified by public action in the form of government 
policies. This section will briefly summarise drought 
management strategies and then discuss some government 
policy implications for these strategies. 
We will eschew a general discussion of drought 
management strategies and refer readers to the references 
cited at the beginning of this section. The traditional 
drought management strategies revolve around flexibility in 
the system and the ability of the manager to adapt to a 
changing environment. Early lambing and weaning, a 
conservative stocking policy, the purchase of replacement 
stock, the use of a "buffer" or "flying" flock, the use of 
specialist pastures (lucerne), and feed conservation 
techniques such as grain, hay, and silage carry-overs are 
all accepted management techniques for light land and 
drought prone areas. Additionally, medium to long term 
strategies such as the breed of sheep, the sheep-cattle 
livestock ratios, and possible cropping programs may be 
influenced by the farmers' perception of drought. 
Farmers are generally considered to be risk averse in 
their management decisions, and most of the strategies 
outlined above are used to reduce risk in addition to being 
accepted drought-prone area management strategies. For 
example, a higher stocking rate may well have a greater 
expected return, but will tend to increase the loss in an 
adverse climatic season. As Dent and Beck (1983) point out, 
as a general rule the more risk averse a farmer is, the 
lower his stocking rate should be. They then go on to point 
out that this, and other drought strategies (breed of sheep, 
for example) are, in effect, an insurance policy. The 
premium is in the form of a "cost" in good years from a 
lower than optimal stocking rate (opportunity cost), lower 
production from the "wrong" breed of sheep, or reduced 
returns from a conservative cropping program. The 
"dividend" is in the form of a lower expected loss during a 
drought period. 
Care must be 
drought to ensure 
drought areas are 
taken when 
that losses 
treated as 
estimating the "cost" of 
to individual farmers in 
transfer payments if other 
1') 
farmers gain from these losses. An example of this is the 
forced selling of store lambs. If these animals are 
fattened in another district or on an irrigated farm then 
the net loss to the nation may only be the transaction costs 
involved. Another example is a farmer selling hay or feed 
barley - these transactions contain an element of transfer 
payment. 
The importance of 
becomes apparent when a 
an irrigation system. 
district. Greer (1984) 
these drought management strategies 
drought-prone region becomes part of 
One such area is the Amuri Plains 
reporting on this project states: 
"Of the farmers surveyed only one believed that 
irrigation was responsible for a change in the 
sheep replacement policy. However, within the 
same farming framework several major management 
changes were apparent. Almost all farmers had 
adopted, or intended to adopt a later lambing 
date. In the past the high risk of drought 
necessitated early lambing and early drafting. 
With irrigation most flocks will lamb in early 
to mid-September and lambs will also be carried 
longer and drafted at heavier weights. 
While the Corriedale remains the dominant sheep 
breed in the area, irrigation has resulted in a 
swing towards Coopworths, Romney and Border 
Leicester-Romney crosses." (p.32) 
While there have been changes in the management with 
the advent of irrigation, few changes appear to have taken 
place in the farming systems: "It is surprising that a 
greater swing to keep cattle is not intended" (Greer, p.32) 
and "few of them (farmers] have definite plans to change 
from traditional farming enterprises" (Greer, p.33). The 
distinction must be made between management strategies and 
farming systems. Management strategies are marginal 
changes, while a change in farming systems involves a non-
marginal change such as a change from sheep to dairying. If 
farmers do not make a change in farming systems, this 
indicates they do not consider it economically efficient to 
make a change. More importantly, others do not consider it 
worthwhile to bid resources (the farm) away from current 
owners and then change the farming systems. Proponents 
possessing religious zeal in advocating the benefits of 
irrigation schemes manifested by changes in farming systems 
would do well to consider this point. 
Irrigation may be regarded by some farmers as being a 
risk reducing strategy. This is when, as Dent and Beck 
point out, an irrigation system is not used to increase 
production but rather to avoid a serious loss in low 
rainfall years. Changes in the irrigation subsidy, coupled 
with higher interest rates (increasing opportunity cost of 
capital) and an expectation of government adverse events 
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relief in the event of a drought, make this strategy more 
expensive, thus raising the "premium" price of irrigation 
"insurance". It is doubtful that partial irrigation ever 
has presented an economically viable option for drought risk 
management. The recent Oamaru experience suggests (Ian 
Warren, MAF, pers com.) that farmers with "some irrigation" 
may have been worse off than dry land farmers during the 
1984-85 drought. He considers a false sense of security, 
combined with higher stocking rates and increased loan 
commitments resulting from the development costs of 
irrigation, has eroded the so-called "safety margin." 
Interestingly, one of the justifications often put 
forward for irrigation is the increase in on-farm employment 
opportunities (Brown, 1984). Research on the Amuri scheme 
in Canterbury tends to refute this "relatively few of 
these jobs have eventuated" (Greer, 1984, p.34). 
An issue related to on-farm employment opportunities is 
the regional multiplier argument. This is also put forward 
as justification for government involvement in both adverse 
events assistance and irrigation development. These 
multipliers are, of course, regionally important. In an 
Australian study, Anderson (1985) considers agricultural-to-
regional output multipliers as typically being of the order 
2, so that a $10 million loss in regional farm output will 
result in a total regional output loss of some $20 million. 
Regional income multipliers are often even higher than 
output multipliers, so that impacts on income and employment 
off-farm can be substantial. He considers it is in 
recognition of the extent of these income and employment 
impacts that governments intervene with policy instruments 
such as regional employment schemes. The relevant issue, as 
Berthold points out, is the question of whether irrigation 
multipliers are greater than other projects: 
"Assuming for a moment that it is in the 
nation's interest to develop one region at the 
expense of all other regions, it is then 
necessary to ask whether there is any reason to 
believe that multiplier effects from large-scale 
community irrigation would exceed those arising 
from a similar sized investment in another form 
- in particular a project with direct returns 
greater than from irrigation and which would 
proceed with no subsidy or with lower levels of 
subsidy." 
The role of irrigation as a drought management strategy 
represents an important area of future research, both from 
an individual and regional basis. The changes in both 
management strategies and farming systems with the advent of 
an irrigation scheme should be investigated further. An 
evaluation and comparison of irrigated versus non-irrigated 
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farms in North Otago and the cost to and recovery from 
drought in that area would provide some answers to the first 
question. The second issue of changes in farming systems 
could be investigated by looking at an established 
irrigation area (mid-Canterbury) and a newly developed area 
(Amuri). 
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SECTION 4 DROUGHT MODELS - EMPIRICAL APPROACHES 
The need for an improved information base for farmers 
to develop appropriate drought strategies has led to the 
worldwide development of computer programs to assist in the 
modelling of drought situations. Critical to these efforts 
is the clear definition of precisely what constitutes a 
"drought" (an issue previously discussed). 
These models can be loosely separated into three 
categories, although the classifications are somewhat 
arbitrary as interactions exist between the types of models 
discussed. Firstly, macro models can be used to simulate 
both regional and national effects. Given a change in 
climatic conditions, an estimate can be made of future 
output and income impacts and hence the "cost" of drought in 
a wider sense. Secondly, micro or on-farm models can be 
used to assist in formulating management strategies for 
individual farmers to adopt. Subjective evaluations on the 
likely length and severity of a drought are required for ex-
ante evaluations of alternative strategies, and this type of 
decision making involves a "what if" approach. Finally, an 
historical analysis of past weather patterns may provide 
some help in suggesting future climatic patterns. This type 
of modelling is categorised as "weather models", and 
information from these can be used to dynamically update on-
farm micro models. 
Using the collective action framework discussed earlier 
in the report, macro models have strong elements of a public 
good while the on-farm micro models are more of a private 
good. Those developers of a micro model could privatise the 
software by the usual copyright process and expect to 
capture a percentage of the rent accruing to the model 
itself. However, the distinction is a little blurred, as 
macro models do have a privatisation value in the commercial 
field. An example of this would be a Meat Company 
developing a stock projecting model. Weather information 
has many of the characteristics of a public good and is 
usually provided by the government. 
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4.1 MACRO MODELS
Wallace and Evans (1985), using econometric techniques,
aggregate individual farm data to assess the impact of
climate on farm production, revenue, and costs. A profit
function is derived, and from this function weather
elasticities are computed. These elasticities provide an
estimate of the effect of changes in this year's soil
moisture deficit conditions on next year's planned outputs,
variable input purchases and profit for an average Class VI
farm. This information enables an estimate of the impact of
climatic events to be forecast one year in advance. The
model can, in the author's words (p.22) "be used to work oui
the various combinations of changes in expected netput
prices which would be necessary to alleviate the adverse
effects on next year's output and variable input plans from
current adverse weather conditions, for example a drought,
for the average Class VI farm." This statement, coupled
with the preceding sentence "prices are amenable to
government policy initiatives; recent examples have included
the supplementary minimum prices scheme and fertiliser
subsidies" suggest the policy object of the paper is to
justify interventionism. No justification or reason is
provided by Wallace and Evans as to why it "would be
necessary to alleviate the adverse effects ... from current
adverse weather conditions" by government policy
initiatives.
The model is, as the authors concede, a first-round
effects model only. Opening livestock units are not changed
at the start of the year, and both input and output prices
are held to be unaffected by weather. Notwithstanding this
limitation, the model does enable some important forecasting
of profits, outputs and selected inputs to be made one
season in advance. For example, in Canterbury an increase
of two soil moisture deficit days in a year - from 100 to
102 days2- will reduce profits of the following year by 0.3
per cent. Similar calculations can be made for output
vectors, and the data disaggregated to a county level. One
major feature which the model highlights is the importance
of wet weather in the previous year for production and
profits in the current year.
No evidence can be found to suggest that first-order
serial correlation between the Dry and Wet variables exists.
1 Following Varian (1984),
inputs are accorded a
positive sign. The
constitutes a production
p.8, a netput vector
negative sign and
set of all netput
possibilities set.
is where
output a
vectors
2 Wallace and Evans warn that the response in profit
should not be directly extrapolated to large changes in
the previous year's weather because of the non-
linearity of the elasticity.
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This suggests that this (or any other) model may be limited 
in its ability to forecast weather conditions. However, the 
Wallace and Evans model should have value in enabling both 
on-farm and regional changes to be estimated following an 
adverse event. 
One major issue of concern at a macro level is the 
effects of adverse events on employment opportunities, both 
on and off farm. The Wallace and Evans model (p.16) shows 
positive elasticities for on-farm hired labour. The second 
round off-farm employment multipliers calculated from 
changes in sheep, cattle, and crop outputs following an 
abnormal year should be of value to both regional and 
national planners. Australian research (Powell and Anthony, 
1985) supports the view that farm employment is not greatly 
affected by drought "the conclusion would be that the 
drought [1982-83] did not lead to any large reduction in 
employment on farms and this particular source would not 
have been a significant contributor to unemployment" Cp.8). 
The authors do concede that jobs are lost in the off-farm 
service and processing sectors. 
Probably the most complete livestock model used in New 
Zealand is the Laing and Zwart model (Laing, 1982). The 
weather variable was measured by days of soil moisture 
deficit, weighted by the distribution of sheep and beef and 
dairy cattle populations. This variable had a statistically 
significant negative impact on ewe and ewe hogget numbers, 
and wool, lamb, and milkfat production. Mutton production 
and the numbers of both dairy and beef cows were negatively 
impacted, although not significantly so. Beef production, 
both prime and manufacturing, was significantly increased by 
days of soil moisture deficit. This is probably because dry 
weather inhibits pasture growth, requiring a reduction in 
stock numbers (as indicated by a negative impact on both 
dairy and beef cattle numbers). Laing reports neither 
impacts of lagged soil moisture deficit nor weather 
elasticities comparable to the Wallace and Evans results, 
but the model has the potential to estimate these 
parameters. 
The New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service 
(Brook and Riley, 1981) also uses an econoclimatic model for 
national forecasting purposes. Using soil moisture deficit 
days, weighted by sheep populations, a prediction can be 
made of the next year's national wool clip. The model is 
valuable for explanatory purposes, but both data and 
aggregation problems do exist. 
Macro models have the potential to be used for 
estimation of regional impacts following an adverse event. 
Unless the event is widespread, this would be more valuable 
than a national evaluation. Changes in individual farm 
incomes on a regional basis have an aggregation problem, and 
an individual or micro model would be of more interest to 
farmers. 
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4.2 ON-FARM MODELS 
With the advent of the micro computer many farmers and 
farm advisors are becoming familiar with the use and 
usefulness of these machines. The discussion paper by Stent 
et al. (1983) describes a simulation model being developed 
by the University of Otago for these small computers. 
Economic consequences of various strategies available to a 
farmer can be investigated under alternative assumptions, 
and this "what if" approach is particularly useful in a 
drought situation. Stock class and numbers, supplementary 
feeds, target liveweights, and drafting policies are treated 
as the variables which a farmer has control over. Climatic 
variables and economic variables are treated as uncertain, 
with their range of possibilities defined. The model is 
dynamic in that each decision commits the farmer to a course 
of action, and a decision tree approach is followed (see 
Anderson et al. 1977). Once the programming model is 
defined and fine - tuned to a particular farm the expected 
cash flow implications of alternative decisions can be 
simulated. However, little progress and limited results 
appear to have eventuated from the project at this stage. 
Australian authors have developed similar types of 
models. Toft and O'Hanlon (1979) discuss a dynamic 
programming model to derive the optimal choice of within 
drought tactics for a stock class on any particular 
property. To those not familiar with dynamic programming, 
the technique is a formalisation of the decision tree 
approach, and each "branch" is calculated recursively. 
Actions are examined for each stock class every time period 
and decisions made on selling or grazing stock and buying in 
fodder. The major drawback of these models is the so-called 
"curse of the dimensionality" the very large numbers of 
small "twigs" emulating from the initial decision "branch". 
These models do have, as the authors state, "real world 
relevance." Field testing of the model, discussed by 
Henderson and Toft (1979), was carried out in the Glen Innes 
district of New South Wales. Results suggested an average 
reduction in the expected costs to the graziers from a 
drought could be in the order of 30 percent if the optimal 
strategy is followed. Even when the simulated drought 
con t inues for the "1 onges t poss ib 1 e per iod" (based on 
historical probabilities) the model offered an average 
improvement of 18 percent reduction in costs. 
Both the Australian model and the model proposed by 
Stent are somewhat sophisticated models, and need an 
operator familiar with the model to gain full advantage of 
the power of the new micro computers. This may limit the 
use of the approach, but they appear to have considerable 
potential for farm advisors and farmers. 
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4.3 WEATHER MODELS
Metereological forecasting models are becoming more
sophisticated and offer scope for medium to long range
projections. The value of such forecasted information can
be assessed as the difference between the expected outcomes
both with and without the forecast. A risk neutral person
would be prepared to pay up to that expected value of the
information, with a risk averse producer incorporating a
premium. Governments usually provide such services, as a
classic externality case exists - the good (the fore§ast)
lacks the conditions for non-attenuated property rights.
How useful
Recent reports
sceptics' belief
forecasters is to
are such medium to long term forecasts?
in the Christchurch Press reinforce the
that one of the major benefits of weather
make economic forecasts look respectable.
"Damp summer likely - New Zealand could be in for a
wet, warm summer and a drought is highly unlikely" (Press 9
October) followed the next day by:
"The official line of the service is still that there
is no guarantee of an early return to more rainfall" (Press,
10 October).
On a more serious note, Maunder (1982) contains a
discussion on Canterbury weather patterns and the prospects
for long-range forecasting in New Zealand. The historical
records indicate there is considerable persistence in
Canterbury's dry periods. However, Maunder considers there
are few positive results which suggest that either long term
forecasting or weather modification could provide any real
help to the farming community in Canterbury:
"For many years the larg~r meteorological agencies of
the world have put substantial research effort into long-
range forecasting. The limited success they have had shows
that there is no quick or easy solution to the problem."
(Maunder, 1982).
3 Cheung (1978) admonished economists for making
statements about classic externality cases before
checking the facts. Having written this section, we
read in Christchurch Press (27th December 1985) that
airlines will be charged for weather forecasting
services by the government. While it may be difficult
to discourage arbitrage, the point is that
meteorological forecasting may have elements of a
private good which is traditionally supplied free of
charge because of supposed externalities. This
underscores much of the discussion in the Collective
Action - Logic and Reason section.
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Revfeim (1985) points out that drought is a difficult 
to define quantitative term, and represents one natural 
extremity of the rainfall process. Occurrence and severity 
of drought are relative to the species which might be 
affected and "to the adaptability to stress depending on 
age, season and management practice." This difficulty of 
definition is highlighted by two observations - (1) the 
1981/82 growing season in Canterbury had the lowest total 
rainfall recorded while at the same time recording the 
second highest wheat yields; and (2), the Marlborough 
pastoral drought of 1982/83 was not relieved by 148 mm of 
rain in April 1983, as the rain fell mostly in one flash-
flood type of situation. The distribution of rainfall 
totals is amenable to the estimation of Poisson process 
recurrence rates and exponential distribution mean amounts. 
This can provide the expected risk of many precisely defined 
situations - for example, the probability of no rain in any 
given month in Canterbury is 0.01 percent, or one in every 
100 years. This would appear to be of academic interest 
only for short-term forecasting. The method can be used 
(based on historical data) to predict the probability of 
rainfall intensities and duration, and thereby the 
recurrence of "drought." 
Climatic events are often thought to be influenced by 
the solar mechanisms, and Tomlinson (1980) statistically 
analyses solar influence on New Zealand rainfall. 
Observations from 1900-1978 were filtered, and from the 
response functions an extrapolation for the period 1980 to 
1990 was simulated. The feature of this extrapolation is a 
dip in rainfall for 1983 not previously reached since 1932, 
and the comment "it seems possible then, that a very dry 
period may occur throughout much of New Zealand in the mid 
1980's." The graph indicates an "extended dry spell" early 
in the 1980's, with a return to normality later in the 
decade. Granted, an ex-post discussion of predictions 
enables one to benefit from hindsight, but the accuracy 
suggests this type of long term forecasting may present some 
help for drought predictions. 
An application of a simulation model which may be 
applicable to New Zealand should a rainfall or forage type 
of insurance scheme be considered is discussed by Selirio 
and Brown (1979). This model was developed to provide an 
estimate of dry matter production for the Ontario (Canada) 
hay and pasture drought scheme. The approach was considered 
unique, in that a weather-based simulation yield is used 
rather than actual measured dry matter yield. 
Precipitation, hours of sunshine, and temperatures are 
entered into the model from actual measurements, and a crop 
growth pattern estimated over the season. Results indicated 
that the seasonal production of alfalfa (lucerne) was 
estimated "with reasonable accuracy." The advantage of the 
model is that a difficult to measure yield such as a hay 
crop can be estimated from actual climatic data, and the 
insurance scheme conducted from these estimates. Problems 
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may arise In New Zealand, as several different soil types 
can exist over a relatively small area. However, should New 
Zealand policy makers consider an insurance plan along the 
Canadian lines (as discussed later), then a model of this 
type may be valuable. 
As Anderson (1979) points out, droughts recur and must 
be seen as part of the environment of the industries on 
which they have impacts. While agriculture and agricultural 
based industries are obviously the major New Zealand sectors 
affected, other actors such as tourists and recreationists 
may appear on the stage as beneficiaries from "droughts." 
Medium to long term forecasting appears to offer limited 
immediate help to planners, although probabilities can be 
placed around specific outcomes occurring. Finally, a 
simulation model of the Canadian type using actual weather 
data may be applicable in lessening the administrative and 
transactions costs involved in a crop insurance scheme, 
should such a scheme be considered. 
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SECTION 5 OTHER SOLUTIONS TO ADVERSE EVENTS 
5.1 FUTURES TRADING AS A MEANS OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
Recent policy changes in New Zealand have freed up the 
economy. One result of these changes has been an increased 
interest in the use of futures markets. The major futures 
markets in New Zealand are Wool, U.S. dollars and Prime 
Commercial Paper (P.C.P.). At present these markets are 
used primarily by importers and exporters to "lock in" 
prices and returns. 
Several factors suggest that futures do not provide 
good prospects for mitigating the effects of droughts, 
floods, or snowstorms. The first is that futures markets are 
very "thin" in New Zealand. There are simply not many 
participants actively involved. The major agricultural 
beneficiaries of the futures markets would continue to be 
the large marketing entities who are "hedging." 
The second factor, as Bardsley et al. point out, is 
that the average farmer is likely to be less well informed 
than the professional trader. There exists little or no 
reason for an individual producer to enter the futures 
market as long as the major marketing boards maintain their 
near monopoly power in the purchase of agricultural produce. 
The third is that in other countries, especially the 
U.S., only about 10 per cent of contracts actually result in 
delivery of the product. If a contract is forward sold, the 
seller must either deliver the crop or engage in an 
offsetting contract. 
The futures market is 
risk but it is not very 
risk. 
a useful tool to reduce price 
satisfactory for handling yield 
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5.2 STABILISATION - RISK AND INSURANCE 
Stabilisation and Insurance schemes are a means of 
spreading and potentially transferring risk. Traditionally 
stabilisation schemes have been directed toward price rather 
than yield instability, e.g. the Meat Board or the Wheat 
Board. Insurance schemes, on the other hand, are designed 
to mitigate the effects of yield variation. 
Quiggin and Anderson (1979) consider that the case for 
transferring risk to government rests on the answer to three 
principal questions: 
(a) Are the risks 
whole? 
independent of national income as a 
(b) Is the private capital market incapable of optimally 
spreading risks, so that individual producers (or 
consumers) must bear substantial risks? or 
(c) Does stabilisation offer a mechanism which enables the 
government to bear risks at costs lower than those 
either of leaving individual producers to bear the 
risks or of shifting risks to the private capital 
market? 
We might also add: Should the government bear the 
cost? What are the efficiency and equity issues associated 
with government involved in an insurance scheme? These are 
the questions which need to be considered in evaluating the 
role of government in adverse events relief. 
The basis of the national crop and forage insurance 
schemes discussed later in this paper seem to be predicated 
on points (b) and (c). There is an implicit assumption in 
all of these programs that individual producers face price 
risk (based on world supply and demand), supply risk on 
their own output (weather, mismanagement, lack of inputs), 
and total output risk for the nation (drought, floods, 
disease). Adverse events insurance is really only aimed at 
the two output risks. 
Bardsley, Abey and Davenport (1984) indicate that five 
conditions must be met for an insurance scheme to be 
financially viable. First, the benefits to the insured must 
be sufficiently large relative to benefits from other 
investments and liquidity costs must not be too great. 
Second, there must be enough individuals in the pool so as 
to maximise risk spreading. Third, the risks faced by 
individuals must be independent, and this is a major 
problem, at least locally, in insuring against adverse 
events. Fourth, the risks faced by each individual must be 
known to each party and should not be open to manipulation 
by the insured. Fifth, the administration costs must be 
low. 
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The major problems in any broad based adverse events 
insurance program are moral hazard and adverse selection. 
It is obviously in a producer's best interests financially 
to conceal from the insurer relevant information. The 
result is that he/she pays a lower premium than risks 
require - the problem of adverse selection. If the insured 
is able by his/her actions (such as being careless) to 
increase the probability of a successful claim, he/she will 
be unduly subsidised by other members of the pool - the 
problem of moral hazard. 
Pauly [1977] and Ahsan, Ali and Kurian [1982] feel that 
the solution to these problems is to equalise the 
distribution of information. They feel it is difficult for 
a private firm to perform this function as economically as 
the government can. Therefore, based on either the Buchanan 
and Tullock or the Quiggin and Anderson criteria the job has 
fallen to the public sector. This does not imply subsidised 
insurance though. 
For any insurance program to function the producers 
must be aware of risks they face and be able to assign 
probabilities to their occurrance. Research has shown in 
numerous cases that individuals either are unaware of the 
risks or choose to ignore them (Patrick, Lloyd and Cary 
1985, Cahill, 1985). The existance of other programs such 
as ad hoc drought and flood relief programs reduces grower 
willingness to participate. Thus the political response to 
adverse events impinges on a potential private solution, 
that of insurance. 
An additional problem arises with drought insurance 
schemes, and this is the problem of definition and 
measurement of drought. There have been numerous attempts 
to provide an operational definition of drought. Seymour 
and Quested (1982) present three possibilities and conclude 
that it is difficult to establish a universal criterion. 
One Australian definition states a drought is "A period of 
rainfall deficiency extending over months or years, of such 
nature that crops are seriously affected." A British 
definition sees a drought as, "15 consecutive days each with 
less than 0.254 mm of rain". Finally an American definition 
of an agricultural drought is when "soil moisture and 
rainfall are inadequate during the growing season to support 
healthy crop growth to maturity and to prevent extreme crop 
stress and wilt". 
A New Zp.aland definition developed by Crump suggests 
that drought refers to the balance between pasture 
production and the livestock's feed demand from pasture. 
For most of New Zealand at some time during the year daily 
pasture production falls below daily demand. If the deficit 
is due to a lack in soil moisture, it is referred to as a 
drought. In Northland and the Waikato this period may last 
from three to four weeks without farmers expressing great 
concern. Conversely, in parts of Hawke's Bay and Canterbury 
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eight to ten weeks would be the norm. In those years when 
the period exceeds these levels, problems occur which 
require superior planning and management. From a pasture 
production perspective then, a drought begins when the plant 
reaches the wilting point. Crump defines the number of 
drought days as precisely the number of days when soil 
moisture falls below wilting point. 
As attractive as Crump's definition appears to be, 
there may be a problem of circularity. The higher the 
stocking rate the more likely it is that feed demand will 
exceed pasture production. The analyst needs to be aware of 
the interactive problems. It is also important to note at 
this juncture that the time of the year when the deficit 
occurs is as important as the length of the deficit. 
Patrick, Lloyd and Cary (1985) note that for Australian 
wheat growing regions "more than adequate rainfall late in 
the growing season will generally not compensate for 
inadequate rainfall earlier." For the pastoral industry in 
New Zealand the same may be true. A shortage at an abnormal 
time, e.g. July to September in Canterbury, will not be 
compensated for by rains the following January and February. 
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5.2.1 CURRENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
The basis of most crop insurance programs found
worldwide are those developed in the United States. Early
attempts by private insurers to write crop insurance were
unsuccessful. The U. S. Federal Government entered the crop
insurance business in the 1930s as part of the New Deal.
The continuing extreme drought of the "Dust Bowl" created
public awareness of the problems facing American grain
farmers. The widespread nature of the problem combined with
low internal and international product prices eliminated the
possibility of individual farmers contracting with the
private sector for insurance. In 1938 the Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation was set-up and began a wheat program
in 1939. Between 1939 and 1969 the program was modified
several times including elimination of coverage in some high
risk areas. According to Patrick (1985), while unfavourable
experiences led to the suspension of the crop insuranc~
program in 1947, by 1969 coverage had grown to $920
million. However, from 1967 to 1969 losses had exceeded
premiums.
The 1970s saw the development of a federal disaster
program. Those producers who participated in commodity
programs were eligible for compensation for delayed
plantings and/or unusually low yields. Over this period
federal programs also included subsidized disaster loans,
emergency feed schemes and indemnity programs for dairy and
beef farmers. As Patrick (1985) notes, "The disaster
programs were popular with producers because they provided
no-cost disaster protection."
The situation shifted rather dramatically with the
passage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. The
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (F.C.I.C.) works with the
private insurance industry. The government's role is one of
marketing and reinsuring policies which are issued by
private companies. Although called multi-peril or all risk
insurance, the policies do not cover mismanagement, poor
farming practices or theft. Covered events include
droughts, floods, insects, hail, frost, wind, fire and
earthquakes. Further, low quality due to a covered cause is
compensatable.
The program presently provides only limited coverage
for hay and forage crops except for corn used for silage.
Also at present there exists no coverage for pastures or
rangeland. Research has begun on the feasibility of
including these in the program.
According to the United States Department of
Agriculture, for the period 1948 to 1982 the major causes of
4 All dollars are in the terms of the country under
discussion, expressed in current dollars.
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low yields were drought (41.9 per cent of indemnities), 
flood or excessive moisture (17.7 per cent), cold weather 
(14.0 per cent), and hail (13.2 per cent). [From Patrick, 
1985. ] 
A major problem facing crop insurance programs 
worldwide is the inability to deal with individual 
conditions of producers. The U.S. program has been shifting 
calculation of premiums and indemnities away from area wide 
average to calculations of Actual Program History (APH) and 
Individual Yield Coverage (IYC). The changes allow for 
above average producers to be encouraged to participate in 
the program since they are now able to have their higher 
level of production recognised for insurance purposes. 
Patrick (1985) reports that producer participation has 
been limited. In 1980 the United states Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) estimated that 8 percent of crop land was 
covered by all risk insurance. By 1983 covered acreage had 
risen to 16.5 per cent. Unpublished data from the FCIC 
indicated that 23 per cent of eligible acreage was covered. 
Studies by Guither et al. (1984) and Patrick (1985) 
suggest that while producers generally prefer the present 
crop insurance program to a return to the disaster programs 
of the 1970s a substantial percentage of growers interviewed 
felt that insurance was expensive. More growers found the 
program complicated to understand. Both authors found a 
number of growers thought the coverage "inadequate." A 
significant education effort would be needed to explain the 
program to potential participants. 
The Congress has established the premium; 90 per cent 
is to cover ordinary losses with the remaining 10 percent 
for a reserve fund for catastrophic losses. Administrative 
costs are covered by government appropriation. Federal 
monies provide a premium subsidy of between 19 and 30 per 
cent (Patrick and Pershing (1985) and U.S.D.A. (1984». 
Patrick (1985) has found the program to suffer from low 
participation and problems of adverse selection. This may 
be due to producers' perceptions that the coverage is 
inadequate, premiums are high, and the program is too 
complex. Even with the changes to individualise the 
program, better producers, especially those who are 
financially secure, do not participate. Rather they tend to 
self insure. Producers with financial problems will view 
crop insurance as yet another cost which they prefer not to 
incur. These individuals tend to be younger farmers who are 
still on the increasing range of the learning curve. It 
also verifies the high discount rate normally ascribed to 
this group of people. 
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5.2.2 CURRENT CANADIAN PROGRAMS 
The Canadian provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba have set up test programs to provide insurance for 
forage crops. The Alberta program has been in place since 
1979 and is based on soil moisture measurements taken one 
per township (approximately 10km by 10km). As discussed in 
our section on meterological models, it appears that it is 
possible to estimate pasture and hay production from 
rainfall data (Selirio). The program compensates growers 
when estimated yields fall below 80 per cent of normal. 
The Saskatchewan program is a refinement and an 
expansion of the Alberta program. Using a computer model 
forage production is simulated, based on soil moisture at 
the start of the season and daily rainfall reported by 
forage producers. Temperature data is obtained from local 
weather stations. This data is utilised to estimate daily 
soil moisture through to the first cutting stage. Using the 
same climatic inputs, long term average production is 
calculated from historical records. The estimated annual 
production is expressed as a percentage of the calculated 
historial average, thereby reflecting that year's growing 
conditions as compared to the long term production 
situation. 
When the estimated annual production falls below 70 per 
cent of the long term average, payments are made to 
producers. All individuals covered by the program within 
the township are assigned the same production and are 
compensated the same percentage. The payment scale provides 
for compensation at twice the rate of decrease in yield. 
This is to recognise the higher cost of replacing lost 
forage. For example, an estimated yield of 50 per cent 
would result in a payment of 40 per cent of coverage while 
an estimated yield of 20 per cent would provide a 100 per 
cent payment. 
Premiums have been set at 8.6 per cent for producers, 
and this is matched by the Federal Government. All 
administrative costs are borne by the provincial government. 
For the 1984 program, producers and the Canadian government 
each paid $62.5 million while Saskatchewan paid $6.3 
million. 
The province of Manitoba has implemented two schemes to 
insure forage. The first program follows the U.S. model for 
grains and other crops. An individual's coverage level is 
based on the producers yields. Premiums vary according to 
soil type and management practices. The level of premiums 
have run between 18 to 20 per cent of coverage level with 
the average coverage of $45-$50 per acre. As with most 
major Canadian programs, this premium is paid 50 per cent by 
the producer and 50 per cent by the Federal Government with 
administration costs being borne by the provincial 
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government. This means the full cost of coverage is around 
40 per cent of the amount of coverage. 
The second program entitled "The Manitoba Livestock 
Feed Security Program" is a test program begun in 1984. It 
is based on livestock rather than on area. Producers buy 
coverage at between $60 and $220 per cow. Premiums are set 
at 7.34 per cent of coverage and shared 50/50 by the 
producers and the Federal Government. 
Base yields are measured in Total Digestable Nutrients 
(TDN) per acre for each of the major sources of forage area 
established for the municipality. The records of a sample 
of growers (approximately 10 per cent) are evaluated to 
determine the average TDN per acre for each forage crop for 
that year. Utilising the acres of each forage crop. an 
annual production estimate is calculated. The payout 
schedule as with the Saskatchewan program starts when 
production falls below 70 per cent. 
Saskatchewan has a low level of producers' 
participation, despite the fact that producers pay only 
47.65 per cent of the program's total cost. This is a 
problem shared by other Canadian provincial programs as well 
as programs in other countries. 
The Manitoba Feed Security Program is unique in concept 
and is still experimental. Henry Nelson (1985), the 
administrator of the program indicates that the need to 
collect data and sell the concept to producers makes the 
program expensive to run. A major concern is that TDN is 
only a partial measure of forage quality and a program has 
begun to compare TDN measurements with actual production and 
clipping programs in order to obtain better base data 
(Patrick pers comm.). 
The payout experience for 1984 was unsatisfactory 
because of a major drought in the test area. Overall 
indemnities exceeded farmer premiums by 8.6 times (Nelson, 
1985). While estimated production in the seven 
municipalities ranged from 124 per cent to 43 per cent of 
normal, five of the seven recorded estimated yields of 61 
per cent or below. It will be necessary to have the program 
run for a longer time before it is possible to determine 
whether or not it will be actuarially sound. 
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5.2.3 CURRENT AUSTRALIAN PROGRAMS 
After an extensive effort including discussion papers, 
hearings, and reports on government involvement in provision 
of natural d i sas ter insurance, John Howard, M. P. and 
Treasurer issued a report in May, 1979 concluding: 
"On 17 January 1979 I announced that the 
government had decided not to proceed with the 
implementation of a natural disaster insurance 
scheme of the kind that had previously been 
mooted." 
"To sum up, the provision 
cover by the government would 
problems as may be considered 
would merely shift them from 
to the political arena." 
of reinsurance 
not solve such 
to exist - it 
the commercial 
Howard's report points out in lay terms problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. The most telling 
comment was "the government also believes that such a scheme 
would be inconsistent with a basic tenet in its political 
philosophy namely, that governments and government 
authorities should, to the maximum extent possible, seek to 
avoid intervention in matters that can be left to the 
private sector." 
It should be noted that the proposal rejected was a 
broad based program of the nature provided by the Earthquake 
and War Damages Commission in New Zealand. The concept was 
to be carried at least one step further by forming a pool of 
general insurers. 
The practical problems became apparent quite quickly. 
In order to make the program work, it was obvious that 
participation would likely need to be compulsory. Otherwise 
if a disaster occurred, calls would be made on government 
for relief programs. A second major problem was that not 
all adverse events were covered and further those covered 
had little or no relevance to the needs and risks of some 
States. Both of these issues are important in the 
development of any insurance program as will be seen in the 
discussion of current New Zealand programs. 
Even though a comprehensive natural disaster insurance 
program was rejected, interest was expressed in 
investigating potential programs for crops and livestock. 
The interest in crop and rainfall insurance has resulted in 
the Industry Assistance Commission being charged by the 
Minister of Industry, Technology and Commerce to consider 
whether the availability of such insurance to agricultural 
industries should be assisted. The commission in its Crop 
and Rainfall Insurance Information Paper (Cahill, 1985) 
pointed to previous studies which had suggested that "A 
general conclusion was that some government intervention may 
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be justifiable on efficiency grounds to assist producers ~n 
undertaking their risk managment II With regard to 
insurance the Commission recommended that there should be an 
investigation of forms of insurance which may be more cost 
effective than other measures in meeting certain objectives. 
In the Commission's paper, the recurring issue of the 
impact of existing government programs on the demand for 
insurance is raised. The authors point to such arrangements 
as marketing boards, drought relief, income equalisation 
accounts, and quarantine regulations as potential barriers 
to wider use of insurance programs. The Commission 
hypothesized probably quite correctly, that individual 
producers would prefer to have the general public bear a 
proportion of their risk through programs paid for by 
general fund sources. 
In response to the lAC request for information, Patrick 
et al. (1985) carried out a pilot study in Victoria to 
determine producer attitudes toward a crop and rainfall 
insurance program. The authors began by evaluating a 
hypothetical program based on average individual farmers' 
yields for the test area. Their conclusion was that had 
such a program been in place from 1957-58 to 1977-78, claims 
would have equalled 48 to 84 percent of the pure insurance 
premium (the level of premium necessary to make the program 
actuarially sound), The level of claims was dependant on 
the coverage desired and yield experienced. 
A more interesting possibility from Patrick et al. is a 
rainfall insurance program. Payments would be based on the 
amount of rain rather than on yields. Such a program would 
avoid the problem of moral hazards and adverse selection. 
In order to implement such a program physical response 
models would be needed. The work of French and Schultz 
(1984) is thought to provide such a base for Australia (also 
see the section on Canadian programs for rainfall programs). 
The results of Patrick et al. 's work are not very 
encouraging for government provision or assistance of either 
crop or rainfall insurance. They found that most farmers 
felt they were forced to carry hail and fire insurances by 
their lending agency and did so only under duress. In 
general, insurance was not highly ranked as a response to 
risk. 
As a drought protection method, crop insurance was 
preferred to a rainfall insurance program. This may be due 
to the respondents not having heard of such a program 
previously. For a traditional crop program (U.S. style) 
participation is estimated at between 70 and 75 per cent. 
Respondents were generally unwilling to pay the full cost 
(25 per cent for 50 per cent coverage and 30 per cent for 75 
per cent coverage). Patrick et al. feels that actual 
participation would be lower; many producers (60 per cent) 
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said they would pay $l2.35/hectare for 75 per cent coverage, 
however they would balk at writing out a cheque for $4,300 
to cover 350 hectares of wheat. 
The prospects for rainfall programs are even bleaker. 
Over 50 per cent of respondents indicated that they would 
not participate. Since rainfall is seen as being patchy, a 
centrally measured level might not reflect the amount on an 
individual's farm; a problem possibly overcome in the 
Canadian program. There was little or no concern for the 
relationship between timing of precipitation and yields. 
Patrick et ~. sums up the study as follows: 
"The results of this survey indicate that 
farmers have some interest in a crop insurance 
program with indemnities based on their yields. 
However, relatively few farmers would pay the 
costs associated with this type of program. 
Area rainfall insurance is not of interest to 
most farmers. This suggests little basis for 
the government to establish or provide 
incentives for crop and area rainfall 
insurance." 
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5.2.4 CURRENT PROGRAMS IN NEW ZEALAND 
There exist currently to industry-wide insurance 
schemes which are worthy of discussion - the United Wheat-
growers' (N.Z.) Multi Peril Program and the Apple and Pear 
Boards' Hail Program. Both of the programs are with the 
Farmers' Mutual Insurance Group. The Wheatgrowers' program 
replaced a self-funded scheme of compensatoin for a limited 
number of events. This program was funded by levies payable 
by all wheatgrowers. As the Wheat Board Act required 
purchase of all wheat by one agency the collection of these 
levies was a simple matter. 
A number of limitations of the self-funded scheme led 
to the establishment of a full insurance scheme commencing 
with the 1980/81 season. The actual discussions about such 
a program began in 1978. Since the risks to be covered had 
to be agreed upon and it was felt necessary to obtain 100 
per cent grower participation to keep premiums as low as 
possible, the implementation was delayed. While it is 
stated by a representative of the insurer that there has 
been no government role in either the self-funded scheme or 
the current insurance program, the fact remains that all 
wheat sold in New Zealand is covered by the Wheat Board Act 
and all wheat sold incurs a mandatory levy. When the 
current program was implemented the Wheat Board Act was 
amended to allow the levy to be collected by the United 
Wheat growers N.Z. Ltd rather than by the Wheat Board. At 
the very least the government has enforced the 
implementation of the program. 
The current program's coverage is interesting in its 
exclusions. There is no provision to cover drought. In an 
evaluation of a claim, an assessor determines the difference 
between actual yield and expected yield without the covered 
event. Adjustments in yield are made for non-insured 
contingencies such as drought (Papesch pers comm). 
There does exist limited coverage for damage due to 
floods. To quote from the contract in insurance, floods are 
excluded: "If the loss or damage being caused by flood was 
the result of negligent farming (which expression shall be 
deemed to include the growing of wheat in recognised flood 
prone areas), neglect of water courses or negligence on the 
part of the Insured." A flood prone area is one where a 
flood has occurred more than once in the preceding ten years 
and where a claim has been made under any insurance or 
compensation policy. Clearly then the United Wheatgrowers' 
policy is not intended to cover the major adverse events as 
perceived by most New Zealand farmers. 
The importance of government involvement even in only a 
tacit sense can be appreciated by comparison of the wheat 
program with insurance for another major grain crop, barley. 
Barley coverage is provided through private insurance 
companies on an individual grower basis. The farmer covers 
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those risks which he feels are appropriate for the length of 
time he chooses. Currently for similar coverage it would 
cost over twice as much to insure a barley crop as it does a 
wheat crop. Furthermore, in many insurance policies on 
barley, claims are paid only if the insured loss exceeds 50 
per cent. 
Loss experience under the Wheatgrowers' program is 
unavailable for confidentiality reasons. The contract 
allows for premium increases "In the event of the claims 
ratio under this Contract of Insurance producing a yearly 
ratio of claims paid and outstanding to annual premium 
received in excess of 50% over a period of two or more 
consectutive years ... ". The insurer exercised its option to 
do so for 1984/85 and again for 1985/86. 
The second industry-wide scheme is administered by the 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board. All apple marketings are 
under conditions set down by the Apple and Pear Marketing 
Board. As part of the Board's program apple and pear 
producers receive coverage against hail damage. Currently 
the policy calls for growers to be compensated at 40 per 
cent of their estimated loss. However, the insured bears 
the first 10 per cent of any amount that would otherwise be 
payable under the policy. 
Data provided by the Apple and Pear Marketing Board for 
the period 1981/82 through 1984/85 shows the program has 
undergone significant changes. First, starting with 
1984/85, assessment of loss is done on the basis of fruit 
submitted to the Board rather than on actual production. 
This change will most likely result in a lower level of 
claims. Second, the price used for establishing the value 
of the crop shifts from a seasonal average to the price as 
of March 1. Third, the percentage payout has fallen from 43 
per cent to 40 per cent while the deductible amount has 
risen to a current 10 per cent of the claimable amount. 
Fourth, the premium has risen fom 1.35 per cent for 1981/82 
and 1982/83 to 1.966 per cent in 1984/85. It seems fair to 
say that the administrators of the program have been making 
adjustments in an attempt to establish the parameters which 
will result in an acceptable loss ratio. In 1981/82 and 
1982/83 with premiums at 1.35 per cent the loss ration was 
201.30 per cent and 215.22 per cent respectively. With 
higher premiums and deductibility in 1983/84, the loss 
ration was a more acceptable 55.4 per cent. It is generally 
accepted that for a sound insurance program the loss ration 
should be less that 70 per cent. Possibly the Apple and 
Pear Board scheme has been fine tuned to the point where it 
will meet this criterion. 
The two New Zealand programs discussed are both limited 
in the risks which are covered. They are not voluntary to 
the producer but rather are mandatory. The trade-off is 
undoubtedly that premium levels are lower than they would be 
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otherwise. Clearly since premiums and excesses are 
constant, producers in less risky areas are subsidising 
those in more marginal areas. Therefore, from a theoretical 
standpoint they may be questionable on efficiency grounds. 
One solution is to establish different levels of excesses 
based on historical claims. 
One other program is worth mentioning even though it 
has been discounted. Until August 1, 1985 flood damage was 
covered under the Earthquake and War Damage Commission. The 
Commission's program is funded by a levy added to all fire 
insurance policies written in New Zealand. The program was 
intended as supplemental not primary coverage. A 
recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Abbotsford Landslip Disaster was that the Earthquake and War 
Damages Commission be relieved of liability for flood 
damage. They noted that such coverage was available from 
private carriers. Many large companies were substituting 
the coverage under the Earthquake and War Damage Commission 
programs. Further, in the case of a major disaster, these 
firms were relying on the prospect of additional government 
assistance programs. [Report of Earthquake and War Damage 
Commission, 1984]. An example of the problem was the 
Southland Flood of January 1984. The Commission estimated 
that 25 per cent of the claims were payable to fewer that 
five industrial/commercial concerns several of which had 
not taken coverage with regular insurers. 
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5.2.5 SUMMARY OF INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
Many governments intervene and provide a comprehensive 
multiple-risk crop insurance policy. This is a special 
purpose policy, in that it addresses yield risk resulting 
from adverse events. However, most policies cover only some 
adverse events and specifically do not cover others. Other 
forms of yield risk such as crop disease and pests 
constitute an important part of yield risk, and these are 
not covered by most insurance programs. 
The experience from both overseas programs and New 
Zealand examples is quite clear some form of government 
involvement is necessary before adverse events yield risk 
insurance schemes become acceptable to producers. In 
practice, many schemes have not fulfilled their supposed 
objectives. One major reason for this is that 
administration costs are generally high. Hazell et ~ 
(1986) found this type of insurance policy has costs of 
about 6 per cent of the value of coverage, compared to 
normal life insurance at 1 to 1.5 per cent of coverage. 
This means that premiums, in the absence of government 
support, would need to be between 10 and 20 per cent of 
coverage if schemes are to be self funding. Thus 
governments intervene, either in the form of a direct 
subsidy such as the Canadian schemes, or in the form of 
compulsory cover with the New Zealand wheat multi-peril 
program (which specifically excludes drought) or some 
combination of both. 
The issue of moral hazard 1S a very real problem. 
Actions of producers increase the risk facing the insurer, 
and this in turn increases the cost of administration of the 
scheme. Additionally, adverse selection becomes a problem 
where allowance is not made for differing probabilities of 
risk between more favourable areas and disaster prone areas. 
Low risk producers have less need to insure and can, in 
effect, be subsiding high risk producers if the scheme is 
compulsory. If the scheme is not compulsory, low risk 
producers (and others) may opt to not insure, thus 
increasing costs for the remainder. 
Many of the schemes reviewed are either very recent or 
are undergoing major changes. This suggests administrative 
costs are high because managers may be on a learning curve 
with new schemes. The Canadian approach, with a simulation 
model applied to whole areas, provides a way of reducing 
administration and monitoring costs and possibly should be 
investigated for New Zealand. 
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SECTION 6 DISCUSSION & IMPLICATION FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY 
The objective of this report has been to examine the 
role of government in adverse climatic events relief in New 
Zealand, with specific reference to drought relief. This 
examination started from a review of the literature on 
collective aclion and the theoretical role of government 
intervention where so-called "externalities" exist. Many 
writers have outlined the problems of intervention. 
Intervention can be justified only if benefits outweigh 
the costs. Costs are often difficult to measure. These 
costs include the impact which a public policy may have upon 
a private solution to a particular problem. Temporary 
relief programs are often made on the grounds that an 
externality exists, and little or no attention is paid to 
either the costs associated with intervention or alternative 
forms of government assistance. 
It is suggested that previous government policies may 
be altering producers' perceptions of risk and having some 
unforeseen impacts. Freebairn (1983) analysed Australian 
drought policies and showed both efficiency and equity 
distortions which have resulted from these policies. This 
report discusses the private response of producers to 
drought in New Zealand and raises the question of 
inefficiencies created when public policies alter the 
private solution. 
Farmers are generally considered to be risk averse and 
policies which have been designed to stabilize income by 
setting price floors have caused producers to move further 
along the supply curve than they otherwise would have. This 
minimisation of price risk may well have been at the expense 
of environmental risk, as producers trade one form of risk 
for another. The net result may have aggrevated financial 
losses from drought, as well as increasing the chances of a 
.. drough t" happen i ng, depend i ng upon whi ch defin i t i on of 
drought one accepts. 
Adverse events will always 
clear the relevant issue is not 
se, but the cost of dealing 
manner. 
occur, and it must be made 
the cost of these events ~ 
with them in a sub-optimal 
Previous drought assistance policies build an 
expectation of future assistance, and accentuate the problem 
by altering risk management strategies of producers. For 
example, financial assistance in the form of concessionary 
loans would not encourage a producer to minimise risk by 
44 
spreading the investment portfolio to include off-farm 
investments and hay and grain subsidies do not encourage 
farmers to carry feed over from one year to the next. 
Public policy has altered the private response to adverse 
events. 
Insurance schemes may need some government involvement 
if they are to be accepted by producers. However, 
subsidisation of insurance schemes may present a least-cost 
solution to the problem of adverse events. Government can 
withdraw, to a large extent, from providing solutions on an 
ad hoc basis and avoid the direct and indirect costs 
involved with temporary assistance. The responsibility 
passes from a public to a private solution, and producers 
are free to make decisions within a private framework. Care 
must be taken to minimise the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse events. 
The worldwide experience of insurance schemes which may 
be applicable to New Zealand to cover adverse events is not 
particularly promising. Still, governments may have other 
objectives which can be met by adverse events insurance 
schemes. For example, in the issue of rural income 
stability, insurance is a means of transferring income to 
farming families, albeit an inefficient means. More 
carefully target ted schemes may be better if rural income is 
a concern. The question still needs to be asked as to why 
government should become involved at all in insurance 
schemes. The first point is that the private sector is able 
to handle insurance schemes. The second point is that if 
the private sector costs are too high to make a scheme 
operational, then why should government subsidise the 
scheme? Problems of adverse selection may mean that 
government involvement is crucial, as producers in more 
favoured areas withdraw otherwise, thus eroding the 
insurance "lase" and increasing overheads to those 
remaining. Also, given the political realities of the 
emotive atmosphere associated with an adverse event, 
government may feel they are obliged to intervene. The 
major point to be made is that government involvement by 
subsidising insurance schemes has minimal impact upon 
private solutions to adverse events, provided care is taken 
to minimise moral hazard and adverse selection and the 
schemes are made attractive to producers to join. Costs of 
administration and subsidisation can be clearly identified, 
unlike costs of many other government interventionist 
policies. The clear policy implication is to fully consider 
effects which agricultural policies seemingly unrelated to 
adverse events may have upon the private response to adverse 
events when these events inevitably occur. 
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APPENDIX I
GOVERNMENT POLICY EFFECTS
One of the major features of the New Zealand economy,
and especially the agricultural sector" has been the degree
of government intervention in recent years. This
interventionism entails a cost, and the indirect costs of
intervention are relevant to this analysis. Adverse events
will always occur, and the relevant cost is not the "cost"
of adverse events per se (the Nirvana fallacy), but the cost
of adopting a sub-optimal management strategy to deal with
adverse events. This is in part an ex-ante problem
influenced by the strategy adopted by farmers before an
adverse event and in part an adaptive strategy adopted by
farmers to alleviate the cost of the event during or after
an adverse event. The second aspect, the adaptive
management strategies, was discussed in the main report and
it was suggested that information gathering and assimilation
could be enh~nced by computer modelling, thus reducing this
cost. The purpose of this Appendix is to look at the first
aspect, the influence of government intervention on the
individual farmers' production decisions and how these
decisions may accentuate the cost of adverse events when
these events inevitably occur.
It is instructive to begin the analysis by looking at a
representative individual farmer's production decision.
Following the basic managerial economics response of
operating where'marginal costs (MC) are equated to marginal
revenue (PI) each farmer will initially produce at point Ql
Figure I
Individual Farmers' Cost Curve
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as shown in Figure 1. The marginal cost curve is rising,
and the contribution to revenue of each unit of output
(price) is constant for an individual farmer. Should output
prices be raised (SMP's) to- P2, the normal supply response
is to expect producers to produce at Q2. If at the same
time the cost structure of the industry is lowered [Land
Development Encouragement Loans (LDEL), Livestock Incentive
Scheme (LIS), interest rate co~cessions] the marginal cost
curve will move outwards to MC. Additionally, given that
producers are risk adverse, a further rightward shift in the
marginal cost curve (supply curve) can be expected if the
change in output prices reduces the price risk associated
with that particular industry. This is shown as MC". The
cumulative effect of all three changes is to move the
individual's supply curve (marginal cost curve) from MC to
Me", producing at Q4. Thus reducing price risk has
increased supply, but producers may have increased
environmental risk.
Now let us examine the collective response, or the
industry supply curve. This can be found by aggregating all
the participants in the industry. Some new entrants may now
be producing this particular commodity, and this is the
substitution effect induced by a change in costs and/or
prices. Thus the industry supply response is very similar,
and differs only in the exaggeration of the size of the
shift from new entrants. Industry supply response is shown
as the shift from S to S' in Figure 2. These two curves are
Figure 2
Industry Supply and Demand Relationships
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(a) Proportionally more new
the industry as the price
(b) the "risk aversion"
not parallel for two reasons.
entrants may be encouraged into
increases Ccost decreases), and
response (Me") discussed earlier.
Figure 2 differs from Figure 1 in that a demand curve
CD) has been introduced, and is assumed to be downward
sloping. The elasticity of demand is the measure of the
relative slope of this demand curve. Prices received by
producers are at P2, while the prices on the "market" are at
P3. Output is at Q4, corresponding to Q4 in Figure I, while
stocks are at Q4 minus Q5, where Q5 is the market supply
clearing quantity when D is the relevant demand curve. To
sell all the extra output, a market clearing price of P4
would have to prevail, with an effective subsidy of the
difference between P2 and P4. Alternatively, P3 could be
kept a~ the market price and Q4 minus Q5 taken off the
market .
Time is introduced into the analysis by changing the
slope of the supply curve, with a long-run curve being less
steep than a short-run curve. Also, the demand curve may be
shifting over time, with perhaps a change away from red
meats representing a leftwards shift while a marketing
campaign may represent a rightwards shift. Empirically it
is difficult to isolate and measure the responses from
different programs, especially when the demand curve may
also be changing. However, the prices P2, P3 and P4 (Figure
2), are often known, as may the quantities Q5 and Q4.
Several changes have occurred over the past few seasons
which may influence farmers' supply decisions. These
changes range from output subsidies through climatic relief
loans from the Rural Bank to the effects of fiscal and
monetary policies such as taxation changes and high interest
rates raising the opportunity cost of maintaining fodder
reserves.
5 An excellent example of subsidies is manifested in New
Zealand sheepmeat policies. Berryman (1985) features
an account of the rendering down of some 40,000 tonnes
of sheepmeat during the 1984-85 season. Had this meat
been sold, Berryman estimates it would have "fetched
more than $100 Million," but instead the meat meal,
bone meal and tallow was worth about $6.5 Million. The
rendered down meat amounted to two thirds of the
increased sheepmeat production brought on by the $330
million in government subsidies paid to farmers during
the season. The Meat Board would have paid annually
about $5 a carcass for up to three years in storage
fees, plus interest charges. Although this analysis
completely ignores the role of marginal pricing between
different markets the point remains that, as seen
later, a considerable taxpayer cost was involved.
Supplementary Minimum Prices (SMP's) probably increased 
output of sheep products for two reasons - the obvious 
supply response from a price increase, and the effects 
(possibly including substitution effects) of changes in the 
perception of risk associated with a minimum price. The 
SMP's were preceded by, and to some extent necessitated 
because of, the output inducing programs of the late 1970's 
such as the LDEL and the LIS. Retrospectively, much of the 
increase in production happened during a period of adverse 
climatic events. An ex-post evaluation of the LDEL and LIS 
schemes should consider the extent to which they accentuated 
drought problems. Laing (1982) confirms the effects of this 
supply response by showing "a dummy variable representing 
government policy such as LDEL and LIS" as having a positive 
and statistically significant effect on sheep numbers in New 
Zealand. 
The important message is that all possible costs of a 
change in policy should be considered before the change is 
effected. Conversely, the removal of SMP's and some other 
subsidies can be expected to reduce supply, thus lowering 
the cost (regardless of the incidence of that cost) of 
droughts in the medium term future. 
One of the most important implications of government 
policies affecting agriculture is the resultant impact on 
farm land prices. The same supply shifts discussed earlier 
are manifested in changes in farmland values. With most 
policies, two issues are involved - equity and efficiency. 
The equity issue is the transfer of wealth, either realised 
or unrealised, resulting from the changes in residual value 
of the factor input of land. Recent changes in land values 
demonstrate clearly that these changes can be negative as 
well as positive. Efficiency becomes an issue when 
financial resources are not allocated to their best use in 
society; an example of this is increased land values 
resulting from the previously mentioned government policies. 
What has been the impact of changes in government 
policies on farmland values and how is this related to 
adverse events relief? One of the features of the New 
Zealand agricultural scene has been the increase in farmland 
values during the late 1970's and early 1980's. From 1960 
to 1984 the price of land that may be called grazing or 
fattening land increased by over 800 per cent, compared to 
an increase in the general price index of around 500 per 
cent (Seed and Sandrey, 1985). This becomes an issue with 
adverse events relief, as new entrants to farming have 
little or no cash reserves to buffer droughts. To the 
extent that risk-reducing policies such as climatic relief 
and supply inducing policies such as SMP's have accentuated 
these increases in farmland prices, the income problem 
becomes a simultaneous oneGo Because some of the private
cost of adverse events is borne by the public sector,
farmers pay higher prices to obtain drought-prone land and
adopt a higher stocking rate than is prudent, th~s
exaggerating the financial problems during drought periods'.
G Relationships between farmland
policies, returns and the general
complex, and form the basis of a
progress at Lincoln College by Peter
prices, government
inflation rate are
Masters thesis in
Seed.
7 The issue of concessional interest rates to young
farmers from Rural Bank Settlement Loans raises a
property rights issue should those same farmers find
themselves in financial difficulty for any reason.
Does the state make a commitment to maintaining these
same settlers on the land? One school of thought would
say no - the loan concession is a one-off distribution.
However, a political lobby exists which pursues the
line of thought that a moral committment has been made,
and these settlers were placed in a serious position by
changes in government policy. Therefore, by
implication, the state must meet its obligations to
these settlers.
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